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The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Full
Faith and the Bill of Rights, 1889-1910
David P. Curriet
In an earlier issue of this Review I explored the constitutional
decisions of the Court respecting economic matters during Melville
W. Fuller's tenure as Chief Justice.' This article discusses that pe-
riod's remaining constitutional cases, which fall into two principal
categories: those interpreting the Bill of Rights and those applying
the article IV command that one state give "full Faith and Credit"
to certain acts of another.2
I. THE BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Domestic Cases
The ringing declarations of the first eight amendments have
figured so prominently in the decisions of the late twentieth cen-
tury that it is surprising how small a part they played in the
Court's early history.3 The number of cases involving the Bill of
Rights did increase during the Fuller period, but it can scarcely be
said that the Court took an aggressive view of its responsibilities
under those clauses.4
Most of the cases can be quickly noted. After Counselman v.
Hitchcock5 had sensibly held that the fifth amendment precluded
compulsion to give incriminating evidence without a grant of im-
munity as broad as the privilege itself,6 Brown v. Walker7 predict-
t Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. My thanks to Karla Kraus
and Richard Levy for valuable research assistance, to Mitchell Daffner for taming the com-
puter, and to the Jerome S. Weiss Faculty Research Fund for helping to make this study
possible.
I See D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic
Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHL L. REV. 324 (1985).
2 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
3 See DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME CouR7 THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS passim (1985).
4 See Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise, 31 U. CH. L. REV. 103, 135 (1963)
("[T]he Constitution had no effective civil liberties content-in the contemporary sense.
-throughout the period [1870-1920] under analysis.").
142 U.S. 547 (1892) (Blatchford, J.).
' Id. at 585-86. The Court also sensibly held that the amendment's purpose required
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ably allowed compulsion to testify after the witness had been pro-
tected from any prosecution related to the transaction in question.8
Bradfield v. Roberts9 upheld a federal grant to a hospital run by a
religious order on the persuasive ground that the hospital's pur-
pose was "purely" secular and that the establishment clause did
not require discrimination against those who also practiced reli-
gion.10 Gibson v. United States" and Scranton v. Wheeler"2 estab-
lished the questionable "navigational servitude" doctrine permit-
ting the United States to cut off access to navigable waters without
compensation.'3 Over dissents by Holmes and Brown, Kepner v.
that it be read to protect witnesses before a grand jury as well as in court. Id. at 562-63. The
opinion is marred by lengthy recitations of barely relevant state-court decisions after the
unfortunate fashion of the day. Cf. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (containing similar
recitations), discussed in D. Currie, supra note 1, at 359.
7 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (Brown, J.). Justices Shiras, Gray, White, and Field dissented.
8 Id. at 610. But see Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (Brown, J.). In Hale, the Court
invoked British authority to state that it was unnecessary that the federal statutory immu-
nity embrace state prosecutions because the privilege itself forbade only compulsion to ac-
cuse oneself of crimes "arising within the same jurisdiction and under the same sover-
eignty." The Court unrealistically termed the danger of conviction in another jurisdiction
"unsubstantial and remote." Id. at 68-69. In Brown, 161 U.S. at 606-08, the Court had ap-
parently reached the same conclusion but did not consider it directly relevant since Con-
gress had validly provided for immunity from both federal and state prosecution.
9 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (Peckham, J.).
10 Id. at 298-99; see also Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81-82 (1908) (Fuller, C.J.)
(upholding a grant to sectarian Indian schools). The Court was on shakier ground in ex-
tending its holding that the free exercise clause did not protect the rights of Mormons to
practice polygamy, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1879), discussed in D.
CURRIE, supra note 3, ch. 13, to hold that members of the Mormon Church could be disen-
franchised, Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1890) (Field, J.), the Church's charter
revoked, and its property confiscated because of its advocacy of the crime, Mormon Church
v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44-48 (1890) (Bradley, J., over the dissent of Fuller, C.J., Field,
and Lamar, JJ.). These measures went so far beyond the suppression of actual polygamy as
to interfere with the basic right to associate with others of the same religious belief. See
PHILIP KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 25 (1962) (concluding that in Davis "the alleged
crime was adherence to a religious belief"); WILLARD KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER 147-
48 (1967) (calling Fuller's dissent in the Mormon Church case one of his "greatest glories"
and noting that Congress later restored the confiscated property); Roche, supra note 4, at
133 (arguing that the "core" of Field's dissent in the Mormon Church case "was that Con-
gress could do anything it liked with Mormon opinion, but it could not 'confiscate' Mormon
property") (quoting 136 U.S. at 66).
11 166 U.S. 269 (1897) (Fuller, C. J.).
12 179 U.S. 141 (1900) (Harlan, J.).
13 Gibson, 166 U.S. at 276; Wheeler, 179 U.S. at 164-65. The Court seemed to confuse
the regulatory power conferred by the commerce clause with a federal property interest. Cf.
Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (creating the public-trust doctrine to
limit the protection afforded by the contract clause), discussed in D. Currie, supra note 1, at
331-34. Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896), on which the Court in Gibson relied, had
been based upon a specific Louisiana statute giving the state a proprietary servitude for
flood-control purposes. Id. at 463-64. In Scranton, Justice Shiras, who had written Eldridge,
dissented from the extension of its holding, pointing out that Gibson too had relied on state-
1985] The Supreme Court: 1889-1910
United States14 concluded without much reasoning that the double
jeopardy clause forbade the United States to appeal an acquittal.' 5
Two conclusory 1909 decisions,", largely ignoring analogous prece-
dents, 17 allowed Congress to evade fifth and sixth amendment safe-
guards applicable to criminal cases by labeling penalties for wrong-
doing as "civil."' 8 Weems v. United States, 9 in a good battle over
court precedents recognizing a servitude under state law. Scranton, 179 U.S. at 181-82. But
Gibson had also expressly said that riparian titles in general were held "subject to the servi-
tude in respect of navigation created in favor of the Federal government by the Constitu-
tion." Gibson, 166 U.S. at 272; see also United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 471-74 (1903)
(Brewer, J.) (despite the servitude, the government must pay for flooding caused by its navi-
gation improvements); Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 225 (1904) (McKenna, J.)
(government need not pay when flooding resulted indirectly from improvements that inter-
fered with natural erosion process); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369-70 (1905) (Peckham,
J.) (holding that a taking to irrigate a single plot of private land met the implicit "public
use" requirement); cf. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 247-52 (1897) (Harlan,
J.) (allowing nominal compensation for building a road across railroad property because
there was minimal interference with existing uses, over a sensible Brewer dissent arguing
that the proper measure was the market value of the easement).
14 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (Day, J.). The case arose under a statute prohibiting double
jeopardy in the Philippines. The Court reasonably concluded that the statute imposed the
same standards as the fifth amendment itself. Id. at 121-24.
Is Id. at 125-32; see also Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354-55 (1907) (soldier
acquitted by military tribunal cannot be retried in Philippine civil court); In re Nielsen, 131
U.S. 176, 190 (1889) (Bradley, J.) (relying on authority and logic to hold that conviction
barred trial for lesser included offense). But cf. Taylor v. United States, 207 U.S. 120, 127
(1907) (Holmes, J.) (government may appeal dismissal of indictment because, as explained
in Kepner, jeopardy had not yet attached); Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533-34
(1905) (Peckham, J.) (another Philippine case, holding on the fictitious basis of waiver that
a defendant who appealed his conviction of one offense subjected himself to review of his
acquittal of another).
16 Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 336-38 (1909) (White, J.)
(sustaining administrative penalty without judicial trial), and Hepner v. United States, 213
U.S. 103, 114-15 (1909) (Harlan, J.) (upholding directed verdict for United States despite
defendant's right to trial by jury).
7 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35 (1886) (civil forfeiture proceeding
within fifth amendment bar on self-incrimination); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,
376-78 (1867) (finding civil disabilities punishment for purposes of the ex post facto and bill
of attainder clauses); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) (same); see also D.
CURRIE, supra note 3, chs. 9, 13. In Hepner, 213 U.S. at 112, Harlan read Boyd as confirming
that civil penalty proceedings were constitutional.
I But cf. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (Shiras, J.) (holding
that an alien could not be put to hard labor without an indictment and jury trial). Other
jury-trial decisions of the Fuller period include Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 37-
39 (1899) (Gray, J.) (seventh amendment forbids one civil jury to review another, but a
"jury" in a trial conducted by a justice of the peace is not a "jury" for seventh amendment
purposes); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898) (Harlan, J.) (sixth amendment pre-
serves traditional requirement that criminal jury consist of twelve persons); American Pub-
lishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 467-68 (1897) (Brewer, J.) (seventh amendment preserves
traditional requirement that civil jury decide unanimously).
19 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (McKenna, J.). Justices White and Holmes dissented, and three
Justices did not participate.
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the relevant history, concluded that the eighth amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishments forbade a sentence dispropor-
tionate to the offense.
Two freedom of expression cases deserve somewhat closer at-
tention. Study of this area tends to begin with the great espionage
cases of the First World War,20 but earlier decisions had exhibited
an even more grudging attitude towards the first amendment.21
The Waite Court had mingled notions of immorality with those of
proprietary rights in allowing exclusion of lottery materials from
the mails22 and had upheld restrictions on the political activities of
federal employees without even discussing the first amendment.2
The Fuller Court was almost as cavalier.
In 1904, in United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 24 the
Court allowed Congress to exclude an alien from the country on
the ground that he was an anarchist. After suggesting that the law
was not a limitation on speech at all and that the first amendment
did not apply to aliens seeking entry,25 Chief Justice Fuller de-
20 E.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
21 See generally Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J.
514, 557 (1981) (concluding, after a review of both federal and state decisions, that "[a]
general hostility to the value of free expression permeated the judicial system" before the
war).
22 See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 3, ch.
13. This holding was reaffirmed in In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134 (1892) (Fuller, C.J.), on
the basis of a distinction made much later in the context of abortion: "The circulation of
newspapers is not prohibited, but the government declines itself to become an agent in the
circulation of printed matter which it regards as injurious to the people." Compare Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state cannot criminally prohibit abortion in first trimester), with
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (state not required to fund constitutionally protected
abortions), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (federal government not required to
fund constitutionally protected abortions).
22 See Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 3, ch.
13. Only Justice Bradley, in dissent, considered the first amendment. Curtis, 106 U.S. at
376-78.
24 194 U.S. 279 (1904) (Fuller, C.J.).
25 Id. at 292. The Court stated: "It is. . . true that. . .he is in fact cut off from...
speaking or publishing. . .in the country, but that is merely because of his exclusion there-
from. He does not become one of the people to whom these things are secured by our Con-
stitution by an attempt to enter forbidden by law." In an earlier decision, Davis v. Massa-
chusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47-48 (1897) (White, J.), the Court had not even mentioned freedom
of expression in upholding a prohibition on speaking in a public park without a permit by
reasoning that the right to exclude everyone from public property "necessarily include[d]"
the "lesser" authority to limit use. The Court quoted from then Justice Holmes's decision in
the court below: "For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in
a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public
than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house." Id. at 47 (quoting from
Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895) (Holmes, J.)); cf. West-
ern Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910), discussed in D. Currie, supra note 1, at 377
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clared that it required no argument to show that a person who "be-
lieves in or advocates the overthrow of the Government .. .by
force" could be denied admission.26 Moreover, if the word "anar-
chist" included mere "political philosophers innocent of evil in-
tent," it was enough, "in the light of previous decisions" not iden-
tified, that Congress had thought "the tendency of the general ex-
ploitation of such views . . . so dangerous" as to justify exclusion:
"as long as human governments endure they cannot be denied the
power of self-preservation .... -27 No effort was made to reconcile
these conclusions with the text, history, or purpose of the first
amendment or to explain why, assuming the test was whether a
measure impinging on expression was necessary for "self-preserva-
tion," it was consistent with Marbury v. Madison" to let Congress
be the sole judge of necessity.29
The second case was Patterson v. Colorado,30 where Justice
Holmes wrote to sustain a contempt citation for publications that
"reflected upon the motives and conduct of the Supreme Court of
Colorado in cases still pending."' 31 Echoing Turner's concern for
countervailing governmental interests without citing that decision,
Holmes invoked state-court and English decisions recognizing a
sufficient interest in "preventing interference with the course of
justice. ' 32 Like Fuller in Turner, Holmes seemed extremely defer-
ential to someone else's findings regarding the necessity for limit-
ing expression: "if a court regards, as it may, a publication con-
cerning a matter of law pending before it, as tending toward such
an interference, it may punish it. .. .
n.315. In Western Union, Holmes dissented from the Court's arguably distinguishable hold-
ing that a state could not condition the privilege of doing local business on payment of taxes
on out-of-state property. 216 U.S. at 52.
" Turner, 194 U.S. at 293.
"7 Id. at 294. Justice Brewer, concurring, more modestly said the evidence established
that Turner "urges and seeks the overthrow by force of all government" and thus it was
unnecessary to consider whether Congress could exclude "one who simply entertains and
expresses the opinion that all government is a mistake, and that society would be better off
without any." Id. at 296.
"8 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
29 Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 386-87 (1819) (refusing to reex-
amine the degree of necessity of a federal statute for purposes of the necessary and proper
clause), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 3, ch. 6. See also ERNsT FREUND, THE POLICE
POWER § 478 (1904) (arguing that the immigration statute was valid because it did not "re-
strain the freedom of speech of anarchists residing in the country").
30 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
SI Id. at 458-59.
32 Id. at 463.
" Id.
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Indeed, Holmes began his discussion of the first amendment
by announcing a far more restrictive principle that seemed to make
his investigation of the state's interest unnecessary: "the main pur-
pose of such constitutional provisions is 'to prevent all such previ-
ous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other
governments,' and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment
of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare. '34 Cited
for this momentous proposition, without elaboration, were two de-
cisions construing state constitutions and Blackstone's view of the
English common law.3" Whether the fourteenth amendment made
the first applicable to the states at all he expressly left open.36
The opinion demonstrated the advantages and disadvantages
of Holmes's characteristic brevity: Holmes neither wasted the
reader's time nor justified his important and debatable
conclusions.
34 Id. at 462 (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313 (1826))
(emphasis in original).
" Blanding, 20 Mass. at 313; Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall. 319, 325 (Pa. 1798). Story
had suggested in his treatise that the Constitution preserved the English distinction be-
tween prior restraint and subsequent punishment. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1878 (1833). Cooley disagreed. THOMAS COOLEY, CON-
STITUTIONAL LIMrrATIONS, ch. 12 (3d ed. 1874). Harlan also disagreed, assuming his conclu-
sion by declaring that "[tihe public welfare cannot override constitutional privileges." Pat-
terson, 205 U.S. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For the argument that the amendment was
meant to confirm the original Constitution's total exclusion of the federal government from
the area of speech and press, see Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a
Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 91 (1984). Story recognized but did not comment
on this possibility. 3 J. STORY, supra § 1885.
36 205 U.S. at 462. Justice Harlan, who had previously argued that the fourteenth
amendment incorporated other provisions of the Bill of Rights, see, e.g., O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323, 370 (1892) (dissenting opinion); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538-58
(1884) (dissenting opinion), concluded in dissent that free expression was an "attribute[] of
natural citizenship" protected by the privileges or immunities clause against state action
and an "essential part[] of every man's liberty" protected by the due process clause as well.
Patterson, 205 U.S. at 464-65.
During the Fuller years the majority held that the fourteenth amendment did not make
applicable to the states the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments, In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448-49 (1890) (Fuller, C.J.), the sixth amendment right to a twelve-
member criminal jury, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 604-05 (1900) (Peckham, J.), or the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,
113-114 (1908) (Moody, J.). Justice Harlan dissented in both Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 605, and
Twining, 211 U.S. at 114. He was able to write for the Court, however, in feigned reliance on
a case that had flatly stated the contrary, that the fourteenth amendment did forbid a state
to take property without just compensation. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 235-41 (1897) (citing Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878)), discussed supra note
13; see also Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (Gray, J.) (holding the
due process clause forbade a state to order a railroad to permit the. construction of a private
grain elevator on its land). See generally D. CURRm, supra note 3, chs. 10, 11 (discussing
earlier fourteenth amendment decisions).
[52:867
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B. The Insular Cases
The most interesting and controversial decisions about the
Bill of Rights during the Fuller era, however, are found among a
series of cases concerning the applicability of various constitutional
provisions to the islands acquired from Spain as a result of the
Spanish-American war.37
The story begins with three 1901 decisions regarding tariffs for
goods shipped to or from what was then called Porto Rico. In the
course of holding that the island was no longer a "foreign" country
within the meaning of the tariff law, De Lima v. Bidwell5 reaf-
firmed that territory could constitutionally be acquired by
treaty39-a proposition sanctioned by long practice and unchal-
37 See generally 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SuPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
708 (rev. ed. 1937) (describing these cases as "the most important fact in the Court's his-
tory" during the Fuller and White periods); W. KING, supra note 10, at 262-77.
38 182 U.S. 1 (1901) (Brown, J.). Justices McKenna, Shiras, White, and Gray dissented.
The same term, in Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901) (Brown, J.), the Court
relied on De Lima and on Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869), discussed in D.
CURRIE, supra note 3, ch. 10, to hold that a tax on goods sent from the United States main-
land to Porto Rico was not a tax on "Exports" forbidden by article I, section 9. Four dis-
senters-Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham-stressed the fact that Woodruff, which had
given a narrow reading to the related clause of article I, section 10, forbidding state taxes on
"Imports," had dealt with shipments from one state to another rather than to an overseas
possession. Dooley, 183 U.S. at 170-72; see also Whitney, The Insular Decisions of Decem-
ber, 1901, 2 COLUm. L. REv. 79 (1902) (criticizing the decision).
3' De Lima, 182 U.S. at 195-96 (quoting American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
511, 542 (1828) (dictum), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 3, ch. 4). In Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258 (1890) (Field, J.), the Court had sensibly interpreted the treaty power to in-
clude "any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country." Id.
at 267. That the subject in question was the right of an alien to inherit land in the United
States suggests the breadth of the authority thus recognized. The court's expansive language
is limited somewhat by the facts of the case; because the land at issue was located in the
District of Columbia, the Court did not hold that the treaty power extended to subjects over
which Congress could not legislate. Four years later, in Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155
(1894) (Field, J.), the Court suggested a narrow interpretation of what constituted a treaty
under the Constitution by holding that an interstate compact respecting fishing rights was
not contrary to the provision of the Articles of Confederation forbidding the states to enter
into any "treaty, confederation, or alliance" without congressional consent. Justice Field
stated:
The articles ... were intended to prevent any union of two or more States, having a
tendency to break up or weaken the league between the whole; they were not designed
to prevent arrangements between adjoining States to facilitate the free intercourse of
their citizens, or remove barriers to their peace and prosperity ....
Id. at 167. The result in Wharton was echoed in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937). There the Court, lent support by the explicit distinction between state "treaties"
and "compacts" in the present article I, section 10, held that not every federal agreement
with a foreign country required Senate approval under the treaty clause of article II, section
2. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330-31. More debatable was the decision in Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503 (1893) (Field, J.), that even the compact clause did not require congressional
1985]
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lenged in the instant case. Dooley v. United States4 followed long-
standing precedent 41 in upholding the power of the occupying au-
thorities to impose tariffs on incoming goods as an incident of
military government.42 Downes v. Bidwell" was another matter;
notwithstanding the contemporaneous decision that Porto Rico
was not "foreign, '44 the Court held, over dissents by Fuller,
Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham, that the island could be discrimina-
torily taxed despite the constitutional requirement that duties be
"uniform throughout the United States. ' 45
Speaking for himself alone, Justice Brown wrote a distressing
opinion in which he came close to arguing that nothing in the Con-
stitution applied to any of the territories.46 As the other eight Jus-
tices insisted, the contrary had long been established,47  and
consent for every agreement between states, but only for those "tending to the increase of
political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy
of the United States." Id. at 519. Since this was practically the same definition that the
Court would later announce in regard to treaties in Wharton, it was just as well that Field
added Story's explanation that treaties dealt with "political" matters and compacts with
"mere private rights of sovereignty" such as boundaries. Id. (quoting 3 J. STORY, supra note
35, at § 1403).
40 182 U.S. 222 (1901) (Brown, J.).
41 E.g., Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1854), cited in Dooley, 182 U.S. at
231-33.
42 The majority held that military authority to tax imports from the United States
ended when the territory was ceded to this country. Dooley, 182 U.S. at 233-34. The Justices
who had dissented in De Lima on the ground that Porto Rico remained a "foreign country"
also dissented from this conclusion. Id. at 237-38 (White, Gray, Shiras and McKenna, JJ.,
dissenting).
.3 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
14 See De Lima, 182 U.S. at 200. For an early argument that Downes was inconsistent
with De Lima-only Justice Brown sided with the majority in both decisions-see Burgess,
The Decisions of the Supreme Court in the Insular Cases, 16 POL. SCL Q. 486, 494-99
(1901).
"' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The duty was on goods imported to the mainland from Porto
Rico. There was no comparable duty on shipments from one state to another, and some
Justices contended that imposition of such a duty would be unconstitutional, Downes, 182
U.S. at 292 (White, J., concurring), though the Court had struck down state taxes on such
shipments on the ground that federal power over interstate commerce was exclusive, see,
e.g., Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873), discussed in D. CURRmE,
supra note 3, ch. 10.
4' See Downes, 182 U.S. at 285-86; see also Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516,
531-32 (1905) (Brown, J., concurring). Elsewhere in Downes, however, he suggested that the
ex post facto and bill of attainder clauses did apply, as well as "certain principles of natural
justice ... which need no expression in constitutions." 182 U.S. at 276-77, 280, 282-83.
47 See Downes, 182 U.S. at 291-92 (White, J., concurring); id. at 360-63 (Fuller, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (power of
Congress to legislate regarding territories limited by the Constitution), and Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) (same)). In Downes, Brown argued that most of the precedents
were distinguishable because Congress had extended the Constitution to the territories in
those cases by statute. 182 U.S. at 258, 269-70. But, as the other Justices pointed out, the
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Brown's theory left one wondering how a nation with only the pow-
ers given in the Constitution could govern territories at all.48 The
real question, as Justice White argued in an impressive opinion ba-
sically joined by the remaining three members of the majority, was
whether Porto Rico was a part of "the United States" within the
meaning of the uniformity clause.4 9
Brown concluded that no territory was a part of the United
States, essentially because, as had been established in Marshall's
time, no territory was a state." The "United States," he argued
with some plausibility as an original matter, meant the states
themselves; an early draft of the Constitution had placed the uni-
formity clause among other provisions explicitly protecting states
from discrimination.51 Fuller came up with troubling counteranalo-
gies in dissent,52 but the great difficulty for Brown was precedent.
Court had not always relied on those statutes, and Brown's theory failed to explain why
Congress had the power to enact them.
" See D. CURRIE, supra note 3, chs. 4, 8 (discussing American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), and Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).
4" Downes, 182 U.S. at 287-88, 299 (White, J., joined by Shiras and McKenna, JJ., con-
curring). Justice Gray agreed "in substance" with White's opinion. Id. at 345 (Gray, J., con-
curring). That the island was no longer "foreign," as held in De Lima, was not conclusive.
As a textual matter it is entirely conceivable for an American possession to be independent
of the influence of other nations without being a part of the United States. Cf. Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (holding an Indian tribe not a "foreign State"
within article III despite a history of separate existence and self-government emphasized by
the negotiation of treaties with the United States), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 3,
ch. 4.
50 Downes, 182 U.S. at 250-51, 259, 277, 278. Brown cited, inter alia, New Orleans v.
Winter, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 91 (1816), and Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805),
discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 3, ch. 3. Winter and Hepburn respectively had held that
citizens of neither the territories nor the District of Columbia were citizens of a "State" for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
"I Justice Brown also pointed to the fact that the thirteenth amendment distinguished
between "the United States" and "places within [its] jurisdiction." Downes, 182 U.S. at 251.
But this proved at most that some places subject to American authority were outside the
United States, not that Porto Rico was. Cf. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1901)
(holding that despite American military occupation Cuba remained a foreign country), dis-
cussed in Downes, by White, 182 U.S. at 343-44, and Harlan, id. at 387-88 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Fuller went further, describing the amendment's "jurisdiction" clause as having
been inserted "out of abundant caution." 182 U.S. at 358 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). For an
earlier argument in support of Brown's position, see Langdell, The Status of Our New Ter-
ritories, 12 HARv. L. REv. 365, 379-91 (1899).
"I Fuller cited Justice Miller's statement in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 74 (1873), that one could be a "citizen of the United States" within the fourteenth
amendment without being a citizen of a state. Downes, 182 U.S. at 357 (Fuller, C.J., dissent-
ing). Fuller also asserted that it was not clear that the framers would have wanted to dis-
qualify a territorial resident from the Presidency under article 11's requirement of 14-year
residence "in the United States." Id.; cf. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, §1 ("The judicial Power of the
United States. . . ."). For a strong anticipatory reply to Brown's position on this question,
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In upholding Congress's power to impose taxes in the District of
Columbia, Chief Justice Marshall had said that the power to tax
extended as far as the uniformity clause that limited its exercise,
and that the District of Columbia was part of "the United
States. '53 Brown responded that the District was different from
the territories because it had been formed out of portions of Mary-
land and Virginia.5 4 Whether or not this satisfied his own defini-
tion of "the United States, 5 5 it had not been the basis for Mar-
shall's conclusion; Marshall had flatly said that the clause's
purpose of preventing discrimination was applicable to the entire
"American empire," expressly including the territories.5 6
To Chief Justice Fuller and his brethren in dissent, Marshall's
decision meant that Porto Rico was part of "the United States. 57
Justice White, for the remaining four Justices, took an imaginative
intermediate view: a territory became part of the United States
only after it had been "incorporated" by congressional action .5
Justice Harlan protested that this would leave it to Congress to
determine whether or not to abide by constitutional limitations 5
but the tenor of White's opinion suggested he was speaking, as he
should have been, only of provisions limited in their application to
"the United States."60 The British empire furnishes ample, evi-
dence that it is not unusual for a country to have possessions that
are not considered part of the country itself, and White catalogued
see Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions-A Third View, 13 HARv. L. REV. 155, 157-
63 (1899).
63 Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra
note 3, ch. 6.
Downes, 182 U.S. at 260-61.
55 Brown elsewhere insisted that "the United States" meant the states themselves. See
supra note 51 and accompanying text. The District was no longer part of a state, see
Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805), though an occasional speaker during the
ratification debates had argued that it would be, see 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 434-35 (2d ed.
1836) (Mr. Nicholas speaking). But see id. at 435 (Mr. Grayson) (arguing the opposite).
:6 Loughborough, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 317.
7 Downes, 182 U.S. at 352-56 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 287-344 (White, J., joined by Shiras and McKenna, JJ., concurring). Justice
Gray wrote separately to say he agreed "in substance" with White's opinion. Id. at 344-45
(Gray, J., concurring). The incorporation thesis had first been suggested by Lowell, supra
note 52, at 176.
59 182 U.S. at 389 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60 See, e.g., id. at 292, 299, 341-42 (White, J., concurring). Significantly, White's conclu-
sion appeared applicable to the troublesome question of citizenship, which under the four-
teenth amendment extended to most persons born "in the United States." See id. at 306,
313. For a sample of the fears conjured up on this score, see Stevenson, The Relation of the
Nation to its Dependencies, 36 An L. REv. 366, 383-86 (1902).
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ample reasons why a country might do so. 61 Not only was there no
evidence that the framers of the uniformity clause had meant to
rule out this traditional distinction, but White impressively mus-
tered history suggesting that early American practice had distin-
guished between mere acquisition and incorporation. 2 On the
subordinate question whether Porto Rico had been incorporated,
White was less powerful;63 but he did seem on respectable ground
in concluding that not everything over which the federal govern-
ment exercised sovereignty was necessarily a part of "the United
States. '64
Three years later, with only Harlan dissenting, the Court held
in Dorr v. United States65 that the constitutional provisions re-
quiring juries in criminal trials66 did not apply to the Philippines.
Downes had settled, Justice Day began,. that unincorporated terri-
tories were to be governed by Congress "subject to such constitu-
tional restrictions . . . as are applicable to the situation. 6 7 On its
face this statement applied equally to incorporated territories,
since by definition everything Congress does is subject to "applica-
ble" constitutional limitations.6 8 Day's emphasis on the fact that
the Philippines had not been incorporated,6 9 however, suggests
" Downes, 182 U.S. at 306-13 (White, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 322-39 (quoting, inter alia, correspondence to show that then President Jeffer-
son had never doubted the power to acquire Louisiana by treaty, but only the authority to
make it part of the United States). Fuller hardly replied to White's argument. See id. at
371-73 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). Harlan, in a separate dissent, fulminated ineffectually
against "monarchical" or "arbitrary" government and professed to find White's distinction
incomprehensible. Id. at 380-81, 391. For a contemporaneous argument that history did not
support White's distinction, see Randolph, The Insular Cases, 1 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 451
(1901).
'3 White said essentially only that the treaty itself had not done the trick, Downes, 182
U.S. at 339-40 (White, J., concurring); he hardly responded to Harlan's argument, id. at 390-
91 (Harlan, J., dissenting), that Congress had "incorporated" the territory by enacting a
variety of provisions creating, among other things, a permanent civil government. See also
Randolph, supra note 62, at 454-57.
The language of Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820) (discussed
supra note 53 and accompanying text), was broad enough to cover all American possessions,
but the Court there had not addressed the question of incorporation of outlying possessions.
See also Downes, 182 U.S. at 387-88 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Neely v. Hen-
kel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901), on the grounds that there the United States had exercised military
control of conquered Cuban territory but had made no claim of sovereignty).
6- 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
*' U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI.
47 Dorr, 195 U.S. at 143.
6 Day finally settled an ancient controversy by flatly declaring that it was the provi-
sion of article IV, § 3, cl. 2 for "Regulations" respecting "the Territory" that gave Congress
authority to govern the territories in the first place. Id. at 146, 149; see D. CURRIE, supra
note 3, ch. 8 (discussing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).
"' 195 U.S. at 143-44.
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that he took Downes as having established White's distinction be-
tween incorporated and unincorporated areas, although White had
not spoken for a majority of participating Justices.70 Indeed it was
only by embracing White's distinction that Day could avoid an ear-
lier decision, which he ignored, that had found it "beyond ques-
tion" that the jury provisions were applicable in Utah before
statehood.71
Day was quite right to concede that Downes had not held all
constitutional limitations inapplicable to unincorporated territo-
ries. As White had stressed in his concurring opinion in Downes,72
all that that case had purported to settle was that such territories
were not subject to a provision limited in terms to "the United
States," and the jury provision of article III contained no such lim-
itation.73 In the intervening case of Hawaii v. Mankichi,74 however,
White had written a concurring opinion concluding, without any
reference to the compelling distinction he had previously drawn,
that Downes "controlled" the jury question as well. 75
70 It was fair enough to conclude that a majority in Downes had held at least unincor-
porated territories not within "the United States," since Justice Brown had said the same of
all territories. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
71 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 347 (1898), cited in Dorr, 195 U.S. at 155 (Harlan,
J., dissenting); see also Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 525-26 (1905) (White, J.)
(reaffirming the incorporation thesis in finding the criminal jury requirements violated in
Alaska); Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 490-91 (1904) (Brewer, J.) (holding the uni-
formity requirement applicable to Alaska because that territory had been incorporated, but
holding that the requirement had not been infringed).
712 See, e.g., 182 U.S. at 292 ("[T]he question which arises is, not whether the Constitu-
tion is operative,. . . but whether the provision relied on is applicable."); supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
73 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The trial of all Crimes.. . shall be by Jury. .....
The sixth amendment does speak in its venue provisions only of states, but in light of the
accepted impetus for the Bill of Rights it would be perverse to conclude it was meant to
diminish the protection afforded by the original Constitution.
- 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (Brown, J.).
71 Id. at 219. In Dorr, three of the Justices who had dissented in both Downes and
Mankichi thought the latter case had settled the jury question, Dorr, 195 U.S. at 153-54
(Peckham, Brewer, JJ., and Fuller, C.J., concurring), but Day did not treat Mankichi as
decisive, correctly noting that White's statement was part of a concurring opinion. Id. at 144
(majority opinion). Indeed, the majority in Mankichi had oddly contrived not to discuss the
constitutional question. After holding that a joint resolution preserving local laws not "con-
trary to the Constitution" extended only "fundamental" constitutional provisions to the is-
lands, 190 U.S. at 217-18, Justice Brown in Mankichi concluded it was unnecessary "to
reconsider the questions which arose in the Insular Tariff cases regarding the power of Con-
gress to annex territory without at the same time extending the Constitution over it." Id. at
218. If the Constitution itself required a jury, of course, it was immaterial whether the reso-
lution also did; the explanation for Day's refusal to discuss the constitutional question
seems to be that the case was "argued upon th[e] theory" that the congressional resolution
was determinative. Id. If the further suggestion that the Court believed the resolution deci-
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Justice White gave no reason in Mankichi for concluding that
the jury provision applied only in "the United States" beyond an
unexplained reference to In re Ross,7 6 which had suggestively but
not decisively held that no jury was required in a consular court in
a foreign country."7 In Dorr, Day essentially said only that the
framers could not have meant to frustrate justice by requiring ju-
ries in "a territory peopled by savages. ' 78 He did not strengthen
this conclusion, as he could have, by citing either Ross or Ex parte
Milligan's7 9 dictum that military necessity would have justified
dispensing with juries in rebel areas during the Civil War. Even if
Day was right that the uncompromising text of the Constitution
did not really require the impossible, moreover, Milligan itself re-
quired some showing that jury trials were out of the question in
the Philippines before holding the guarantee inapplicable, 0 and
Day did not make it. Thus the important question of the geograph-
ical scope of the criminal jury was decided essentially without ex-
planation; and the dissenters never managed to show why in Jus-
sive, id., meant that the Justices thought Downes had settled the inapplicability of the con-
stitutional jury provisions, the Court had some explaining to do, for reasons given in the
text. See text accompanying notes 72-81.
On the nonconstitutional issue, the majority in Mankichi was not persuasive; the reso-
lution did not say that only "fundamental" provisions were extended to the islands, and, as
counsel argued, all constitutional requirements were "equally imperative whatever view the
court may take of the[ir] relative importance." 190 U.S. at 206. Once again Justice White
had a better theory: the resolution merely made clear that nothing in its terms should be
read to preserve any laws inconsistent with those "fundamental" constitutional provisions
"which were by their own force applicable to the territory with which Congress was deal-
ing." Id. at 220-21 (White, J., concurring); cf. D. CURRIn, supra note 3, ch. 10 (discussing the
controversy over whether the fourteenth amendment provision forbidding states to abridge
"the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" made provisions previously
limiting only the United States binding on the states as well).
76 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (Field, J.).
7 There is language in Ross to support both its extension to unincorporated territories
and its limitation to foreign countries. Cf. supra note 49 (discussing critically the distinction
drawn in Downes and De Lima between American possessions and foreign countries).
Additional cases cited by White in Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 220 (White, J., concurring),
holding the Bill of Rights inapplicable to state action, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516 (1884), were even less clearly relevant, since White did not seem to deny that the action
complained of in Mankichi was that of agents of the federal government. An argument
might have been made that the indigenous authorities, like Indian tribes, were not in fact
exercising federal authority, cf. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-84 (1896) (White, J.)
(grand jury requirement inapplicable to Cherokee Nation because no exercise of federal au-
thority involved), but White did not develop this argument either.
71 Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148. He added with less force that he also did not believe they had
meant to require juries where contrary to local customs. Id.
79 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124-27 (1866), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 3, ch. 9.
so 71 U.S. (4 Wall) at 127 (martial law justifiable only if there is a real threat, "such as
effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration").
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tice White's own terms the jury question was different from the
uniformity issue decided in Downes."'
II. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Article IV's requirement that "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Pro-
ceedings of every other State" 2 had not figured prominently in Su-
preme Court decisions of the first hundred years. Two important
principles respecting this clause and its implementing statute,83
however, had been established without much discussion. In gen-
eral, a judgment was to be given the same effect everywhere that it
had in the state that had rendered it, 84 but the judgment of a court
lacking jurisdiction according to traditional rules of private inter-
national law was entitled to no respect.8 The Court under Fuller
took several opportunities to elaborate these principles.
A. Huntington v. Attrill
Huntington sued in Maryland to enforce a New York judg-
ment obtained under a statute making directors who had made
false statements liable for corporate debts. The Maryland court
found the judgment "penal" 'and refused to enforce it. The Su-
preme Court, in an 1892 Gray opinion, reversed: it was true that
penal judgments fell outside the full faith and credit clause, but
this judgment was not penal.8 6
For the first proposition, Gray relied on his own recent opin-
ion in Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 7 where, in holding its
own original jurisdiction limited to civil cases, the Court had said
the relevant clause of article III gave jurisdiction only over cases
that could otherwise have been brought outside the state whose
law was being applied and that full faith would not require one
81 Justice Peckham did say in Dorr that Downes was not controlling, but he did not say
how the issue was different; he said only that there had been no opinion for the majority.
Dorr, 195 U.S. at 154 (Peckham, J., concurring).
82 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
83 Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982)).
84 See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra
note 3, ch. 8.
8 See D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1851), discussed in D. CUiRIE, supra
note 3, ch. 8; see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729 (1878) ("full faith and credit" not
required when rendering court lacked jurisdiction over parties or subject mhtter); D. CURarE,
supra note 3, ch. 11 (discussing Pennoyer, its progeny, and procedural due process).
86 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683, 686 (1892).
8- 127 U.S. 265 (1888), cited in Huntington, 146 U.S. at 670-72, 685.
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state to enforce the penal judgments of another.88 The reason given
in both cases seemed to be that the rule against enforcing foreign
penal laws went to the jurisdiction of the enforcing court; it had
long been said that the full faith and credit clause, though making
the judgments of other states conclusive, gave no court jurisdiction
to enforce them.8 9
This reasoning seemed to invite the states to ignore sister-
state judgments by denying their own courts jurisdiction, arguably
depriving the clause of much of its effect.90 An alternative argu-
ment would have been that since the clause did not do away with
the requirement that the rendering court satisfy traditional juris-
dictional requirements, it did not do away with other traditional
requirements either, including the rule about penal laws.91 One
88 127 U.S. at 289-92. Pelican Insurance was influenced by fear that the Supreme
Court might be flooded with petty original suits. Id. at 300. Gray naturally did not allude to
this in Huntington.
"' See Huntington, 146 U.S. at 685; Pelican Insurance, 127 U.S. at 291-92.
"o See infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (discussing Fauntleroy v. Lure, 210
U.S. 230 (1908)). However, Gray's principle that the clause did not require the assertion of
jurisdiction seemed to be qualified by his sensible caveat that the decision that the law was
penal, like the decision that a state had not made a contract it was accused of impairing,
must be subject to Supreme Court review to prevent evasion of the full faith requirement.
Huntington, 146 U.S. at 683-84; cf. D. CumE, supra note 3, ch. 7 (discussing contract clause
cases).
It seemed inconsistent with this insight, and with the similar conclusion reached in
Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900) (Brewer, J.), for the Court to hold at
about the same time that whether one state had misinterpreted another's law did not raise a
federal question meriting Supreme Court review. See Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
187 U.S. 491 (1903) (Brown, J.); Glenn v. Garth, 147 U.S. 360 (1893) (Fuller, C.J.). There
was no suggestion in either of these opinions, as there had been in Huntington, 146 U.S. at
683-84, that the clause distinguished between laws and judgments. Indeed, when the deci-
sions were reaffirmed in 1909, the Court expressly stated in dictum that a state constitution
was entitled to as much credit as a judgment because it was a "public act[]" within the
meaning of the constitutional provisions. Smithsonian Inst. v. St. John, 214 U.S. 19, 28-29
(1909) (Brewer, J.). Moreover, though some language in Glenn had suggested that the diffi-
culty lay in the limited categories of federal questions then subject to Supreme Court review
under the governing statute, 147 U.S. at 367-68 (distinguishing nonreviewable questions of
"construction" from reviewable questions of "validity" of state statutes); see also Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (repealed 1928) (narrowly restricting the Court's power
to review highest state court decisions on writ of error), later decisions went further, see
Johnson, 187 U.S. at 496 (construction issue "not a Federal question"); Smithsonian, 214
U.S. at 29 ("[Ilt is settled that the mere construction by a state court of the statute of
another State, without questioning its validity, does not deny to it the full faith and credit
demanded by the constitutional provision."). But see B. Currie, Full Faith and Credit,
Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 Sup. CT. Rav. 89, 111 (approving the con-
trary view of some modern cases, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962), that the correctness
of the state court's interpretation of the rendering state's law is a federal question).
91 See D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 175-76 (1851) (discussing the tradi-
tional lack of respect for the judgment of a court rendered without service of process:
"There was no evil in this part of the existing law,. . . and in our opinion Congress did not
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might in response question whether recognition of traditional ex-
ceptions was consistent with a clause designed to make mandatory
what had once been a matter of comity; 2 but the same objection
could have been leveled against the longstanding jurisdictional
exception.93
To show that the New York judgment in Huntington was not
penal, Gray quoted at tiresome length from a flock of decisions,
some of which had concluded that "penal" claims did not include
private damage actions even though the measure of recovery was
not apportioned to the harm the defendant had caused.9 4 Unfortu-
nately, however, he had to admit there was a split of authority.9 5
That made it impossible to determine what "penal" really meant
without understanding the purpose of the rule, and Gray spent so
much time quoting other people's conclusions that he never got
around to saying what that purpose was. An examination of the
reasons usually given to support the rule suggests that Gray was
right not to consider the law before him "penal, 9 6 but his opinion
intend to overthrow the old rule . . . ."). In support of an exception for penal judgments
one might also argue that article IV already provided for enforcement of criminal laws by
the distinct means of extradition. This argument would support an even narrower definition
of "penal" laws than that taken by the Court in Huntington. For a discussion of the differ-
ent definitions of "penal," see infra note 96.
92 See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813) (Story, J.) ("Were. . .judg-
ments . . . considered prima facie evidence only, this clause in the constitution would be
utterly unimportant and illusory."); 3 J. STORY, supra note 35, §§ 1303-04; cf. Kentucky v.
Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107-09 (1861) (making similar argument in construing ex-
tradition clause of article IV), discussed in D. CURRm, supra note 3, ch. 8.
93 See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S.
(11 How.) 165 (1851)). Justice Story, who as indicated was a firm believer that the merits of
the rendering court's decision could not be reexamined, argued without explanation that
jurisdiction was different. 3 J. STORY, supra note 35, § 1307.
:4 146 U.S. at 666-69, 673-82.
5' Id. at 679 (dismissing contrary cases as having given "no reasons ... for considering
the statute a penal law in the strict, primary and international sense").
96 See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 611 comment a (1934) (adopting Hunting-
ton's definition: a penalty is "punishment for a civil wrong," not compensation for loss suf-
fered by injured party); Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental
Claims, 46 HARv. L. REv. 193, 211, 225 (1932) (explaining the rule largely in terms of provi-
sions requiring local juries and the availability of extradition). There was also a strong argu-
ment that the basic reasons for the penal exception were inapplicable to suits for enforce-
ment of judgments. See ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 204-205 (1962); cf.
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 275-77 (1935) (holding a tax judgment
entitled to full faith and credit despite an assumed rule that tax claims not reduced to
judgment need not be enforced: "We can perceive no greater possibility of embarrassment
[by conflicting interpretations of sister-state laws] in litigating the validity of a judgment for
taxes and enforcing it than any other for the payment of money."). The traditional rule
seems nevertheless to have embraced such suits. See JOSEPH STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 608-09, 628 (1834). Gray said only that "[tihe essential nature and real foundation of a
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did not give satisfactory reasons for that conclusion. 97
B. Fauntleroy v. Lum
For all its talk about how the full faith and credit clause was
not absolute, Huntington had required a state to respect a judg-
ment, as did the even more famous 1908 decision in Fauntleroy v.
Lum."8
Fauntleroy had recovered a Missouri judgment on a Missis-
sippi contract respecting cotton futures. A Mississippi court re-
fused to enforce the judgment, and the Supreme Court reversed.
Marshall had held that one state must give the judgment of an-
other's competent court the same credit it had at home; the judg-
ment was conclusive in Missouri; and that, said Holmes, was that.99
For the four dissenters, Justice White raised two interesting
objections. Not only had Gray suggested in Huntington and in Pel-
ican Insurance that the reason one state need not enforce an-
other's penal judgments was that the full faith clause did not re-
quire it to take jurisdiction;100 as White noted, Holmes himself had
written for a unanimous Court in 1903 to hold squarely that a state
could decline jurisdiction to enforce an ordinary civil judgment.101
Holmes responded that the Mississippi law forbidding enforcement
of futures contracts in Fauntleroy created a "rule of decision"
rather than a bar to jurisdiction; 102 he did not explain what earthly
significance this distinction had to the terms or purposes of the full
faith clause. 103 If Holmes had thought better of his earlier decision,
cause of action are not changed by recovering judgment upon it." Pelican Insurance, 127
U.S. at 292.
'7 Fuller dissented, arguing without reasoning that whether the judgment was penal
was not a federal question. Huntington, 146 U.S. at 688.
93 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
11 Id. at 236-37 (citing Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818), which
had relied on Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813), discussed supra note 92).
100 See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
101 See Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 245 (White, J., joined by Harlan, McKenna and Day,
JJ., dissenting) (citing Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373
(1903)). The statute in Anglo-American had allowed one foreign corporation to sue another
only on a local cause of action. 191 U.S. at 373.
102 210 U.S. at 234-36.
'03 If Holmes's rationale was that a jurisdictional dismissal would not bar a subsequent
suit elsewhere, he drew the wrong line; the question should have been whether the dismissal,
jurisdictional or not, was meant to bar only the remedy or the substantive right as well. Cf.
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932) (dismissal of foreign cause of
action on ground of public policy merely denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired underlying
right); Warner v. Buffalo Drydock Co., 67 F.2d 540, 541 (2d Cir. 1933) ("[T]he judgment of
the court of a foreign state which dismisses a cause of action because of the statute of limi-
tations of the forum is not a decision upon the merits and is not a bar to a new action upon
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he would have been on firm ground to say so: 10 4 it is hard to con-
clude that a state has fulfilled its statutory duty to give a judgment
the same credit it would have had where rendered, as the imple-
menting statute requires, when the state refuses to enforce the
judgment at all.105
White's other tack was to argue that the clause did not require
respect for all valid judgments even if the enforcing court did have
jurisdiction. 06 On this point he claimed the authority of the penal
exception recognized in Pelican Insurance,0 7 which Holmes,
rather than distinguishing, dismissed as dictum. 08 Dictum in the
technical sense it was, though it had been an important part of the
Court's explanation for the actual holding; it was also dictum when
repeated in Huntington,'0 ° which oddly enough neither side cited
at all.
White did not contend that the judgment in Fauntleroy was
penal. He argued instead that its enforcement would deprive Mis-
sissippi of the power to legislate with respect to activities within
her own borders; Mississippi had expressed a strong public policy
against gambling in cotton futures, and the Court's decision al-
the identical claim in the courts of another state."). However, in many cases even a dismis-
sal barring only the remedy would leave the judgment holder without practical recourse, just
as he would have been before the full faith clause was adopted.
10 As he later did in Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411, 414-15 (1920), despite
an unconvincing attempt to distinguish Anglo-American on the basis of "the views about
foreign corporations that had prevailed unquestioned since Bank of Augusta v. Earle, [38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 517 (1839)]." Holmes stated, "[A] State cannot escape its constitutional obli-
gations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction ... to courts otherwise competent."
Kenney, 252 U.S. at 415.
105 See B. Currie, supra note 90, at 119-20; 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONvENTION OF
1787, at 447 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) ("Mr. Wilson & Docr. Johnson supposed the mean-
ing to be that Judgments in one state should be the ground of actions in other states
.... ") [hereinafter cited as CONVNTmON REcoRDs]. The holding that full faith did not re-
quire a state to enforce foreign judgments also seems irreconcilable with the almost contem-
poraneous holding in General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908), discussed in D. Currie,
supra note 1, at 386 n.372, that a state could not close its courts on sovereign immunity
grounds to suits to enjoin state officers from violating federal rights. Cf. D. CURIE, supra
note 3, chs. 5, 7 (discussing the extent to which a law abridging a preexisting remedy for
breach of contract is an impairment of contracts in violation of article I, section 10).
Jo 210 U.S. at 241-44 (White, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 242-44. Pelican Insurance is discussed supra notes 87-90 and accompanying
text.
1os 210 U.S. at 237 (majority opinion). Holmes might have pointed out that Gray had
explained the penal exception as part of the general rule that the Constitution did not re-
quire a state court to take jurisdiction to enforce foreign judgments. See supra notes 87-90
and accompanying text. But see Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 83 (1907) (dictum)
(describing Pelican Insurance, in the teeth of Gray's opinion in that case, as "no denial of
the jurisdiction of the court, but a decision upon the merits").
1o See 146 U.S. at 670-72, discussed supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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lowed that policy to be frustrated by filing suit in another state.110
An exception for laws contrary to the public policy of the forum,
White suggested, was as much a part of traditional conflict-of-laws
doctrine as the penal exception itself."' If the full faith and credit
clause-which in conformity with his unsympathetic interpretation
White kept referring to as the "due faith and credit clause"-did
not override traditional exceptions for lack of jurisdiction or for
penal claims, parallelism would suggest that it did not override the
traditional public policy exception either.11 2
White's concern seemed to raise a substantial doubt: could the
framers have meant to deny a state the power to legislate for its
own affairs? " The unanimous decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana'14
eleven years before might be thought to have provided an answer:
there was no need to distort the full faith and credit clause to
avoid reaching absurd results because the state's interest was ade-
quately protected by the ability of the defendant to argue in the
original proceeding that due process required the application of
Mississippi law.115
The weak spot in this argument is that there seems to have
been no such limit on state choice-of-law decisions before the four-
teenth amendment was adopted in 1868. The later view that the
full faith clause's own reference to "public Acts" required respect
for the law of the appropriate state1 6 may be out of line with the
intentions of the framers. "117 Fauntleroy can thus most effectively
110 See 210 U.S. at 239-41 (White, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 241-43. See J. STORY, supra note 96, §§ 25, 36, 38, 259; 2 JOSEPH BEALE, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 445.1 (1935).
112 See, e.g., Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 242 ("[T]he purpose of the due faith and credit
clause was . . . simply to make obligatory that duty which, when the Constitution was
adopted rested ... in comity alone.").
113 For a more recent version of this argument, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 103 comment b (1971) (allowing a public policy exception in "extremely rare"
instances involving "too large a sacrifice" of state interests), and see the vigorous response
in Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for Its Withdrawal, 113
U. PA. L. Rav. 1230, 1240 (1965) (advocating strict adherence to Fauntleroy).
"' 165 U.S. 578 (1897), discussed in D. Currie, supra note 1, at 375-78.
15 See ROBERT LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 75 (3d ed. 1977) ("Appeal rather
than collateral attack was the losing party's proper remedy. .... ).
116 See, e.g., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1932).
117 The origin of.the "public Acts" language was a concern for individual insolvency
acts that were similar in effect to judicial judgments. See 2 CONvENTION RECORDS, supra
note 105, at 447 (Messrs. Wilson and Johnson) ("acts of the Legislatures should be included,
for the sake of Acts of insolvency &c"); Comment, Conflict of Laws-Full Faith and Credit
as Applied to Statutes, 51 MICH. L. Rav. 267, 269 (1952). Justice Story's influential treatises
spoke of full faith and credit only in the context of judgments. J. STORY, supra note 96,
§ 609. He did not suggest that the clause qualified in any way the applicability to states of
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be defended on the ground that a public policy exception could
easily have destroyed the clause altogether: if a state were free to
reject any judgment contrary to its own policy, we would return to
the situation the clause was designed to avoid.
Some infringement of one state's interest by another, in other
words, may have been the price of full faith and credit. Holmes
said none of this; in his lofty way he managed hardly to respond at
all to White's provocative challenge.
C. Clarke v. Clarke
Whatever the gaps in Holmes's reasoning, it seemed clear after
Fauntleroy-with some uncertainty as to the status and nature of
the penal exception-that full faith required any court with juris-
diction to give the judgment of another state's court with jurisdic-
tion the same effect it would have had in the state where it was
rendered.11 Most of the Fuller Court's decisions in this field, how-
ever, dealt with the question whether the rendering court had had
jurisdiction to begin with.
The first such decision came in 1900, when in Clarke v.
his general principle that "whatever force and obligation the laws of one country have in
another, depends solely on the laws, and municipal regulations of the latter." Id. at § 23; see
also 3 J. STORY, supra note 35, §§ 1297-1307. Indeed, Gray had seemed to say in Huntington
that nothing in the clause required enforcement of foreign claims not reduced to judgment.
See supra note 90. But suggestions of the opposite theory were already appearing. See Atch-
ison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 66-68 (1909), discussed infra note 126; El Paso &
N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1909); Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386, 394-95
(1910). A notable example is the flat unexplained dictum in Smithsonian Inst. v. St. John,
214 U.S. 19 (1909), relying upon the assumption in an earlier case that "public Acts" in-
cluded a statute incorporating an individual railroad and finding there had been no denial of
full faith and credit. Id. at 28-29 (citing Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119
U.S. 615, 622 (1877) (Waite, C.J.)). In BRAINERD CURRm, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1963), Professor Currie argued that to limit the clause to "legislative decrees of
insolvency and divorce . . . not only trivializes the constitutional provision but is in the
teeth of clear evidence indicating that the final reference to 'public Acts' was intended to
exclude just such legislation from coverage." Id. at 198 n.35 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted). The "clear evidence" referred to was Professor Crosskey's speculation that the
insertion of the suggestive word "public" was based on the same antipathy to special legisla-
tion that induced the framers to limit Congress to enactment of "uniform" bankruptcy laws.
1 WILLIAM CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
542-44 (1953).
18 See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910) (White, J.) (reaffirming the holding of Bar-
ber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859), that alimony decrees were entitled to full faith,
reversing Connecticut's reading of New York law, cf. supra note 90 (discussing Huntington),
and requiring enforcement of past-due sums under an alimony decree though it had been
modifiable before the sums fell due); cf. Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901) (Gray, J.)
(refusing to require enforcement of a similar decree as to future installments because the
power to modify deprived the decree of binding force even in the rendering state).
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Clarke"9 the Court unanimously upheld the refusal of a Connecti-
cut court to honor a South Carolina decree respecting the inherit-
ance of Connecticut land. For the most part, Justice White's opin-
ion reads remarkably like his later dissent in Fauntleroy: if Con-
necticut had to recognize a South Carolina decree, she could not
control the ownership of land within her own borders. 20 Since all
parties concerned appeared to be from South Carolina, 2' the mod-
ern observer may be inclined to take issue with White's conclusion
that the substance of the matter was none of South Carolina's bus-
iness.'22 But the more striking fact is that, despite the similarity of
his arguments in the two cases, White did not invoke Clarke at all
when he dissented from Fauntleroy eight years later.
The explanation is that the Court had not held in Clarke that
a judgment could be collaterally attacked for applying the wrong
law; as the last paragraph of the opinion reveals, the decision was
based upon "a want of jurisdiction. . . over the particular subject-
matter."'s2 This conclusion, however, looks at least as peculiar to-
day as the argument that the law of the situs must control. As
noted, all the parties seemed to be South Carolinians, and nor-
mally the mere fact that foreign law is to be applied does not de-
prive an otherwise convenient forum of the power to hear the
case. 24 Indeed, within nine years after Clarke the Court was to
hold in Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Railway v. Sowers1 5 that
one sovereign could not prevent the courts of another from enter-
taining claims based upon the former's law. 2  The difference be-
12" 178 U.S. 186 (1900).
120 Id. at 190-92; see also Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1910) (Day, J.)
(holding full faith did not require the state where land was situated to recognize a statute of
another state respecting the right to inherit land: "The full faith and credit clause ...
applies with no more effect to the legislative acts of a foreign State than it does to the
judgments of the Courts of such State .... The legislature of Michigan had no power to
pass an act which would affect the transmission of title to lands located in the State of New
York."). For a general statement of the traditional primacy of the law of the situs, see J.
STORY, supra note 96, § 483.
121 178 U.S. at 186.
Mzz See, e.g., MOFFATT HANCOCK, STUDIES IN MODERN CHOICE-OF-LAw: TORTS, INSUR-
ANCE, LAND TITLES chs. 10-12 (1984); Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16
STAN. L. RFv. 1, 15-17 (1963).
123 178 U.S. at 195.
124 See H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 96, at 177 (4th ed. 1964); J.
STORY, supra note 96, § 538.
12- 213 U.S. 55 (1909) (Day, J.).
126 Id. at 70-71; cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611-13 (1951) (holding full faith and
credit forbade one state to dismiss as contrary to public policy wrongful-death action based
on another's law). The basis for the Sowers decision was that, although the place where an
accident occurred had power to determine the substantive rights arising out of the occur-
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tween the two cases lay in the traditional distinction between tran-
sitory and local actions: an action for personal injuries could be
brought anywhere, 127 but actions respecting land could be brought
only where the land lay.128 Modern observers tend to be unsympa-
thetic to the local-action rule at least in its more extreme applica-
tions,"" but it was firmly established when Clarke was decided; 130
and that meant that under traditional principles the South Caro-
lina court had lacked jurisdiction.1 31
From today's perspective everything about Clarke looks
wrong. It is hard to see why Connecticut should have sole author-
ity to regulate the descent of property among South Carolina citi-
zens. It is hard to see why, even if it has, South Carolina should
lack jurisdiction to determine the controversy according to Con-
necticut law. Finally, it is hard to see why, even if the defect was
jurisdictional, the objection should not as a general rule have to be
raised in the South Carolina proceeding.1 32 All of these things,
rence, it could not determine the jurisdiction of a court outside its borders. 213 U.S. at 70.
Holmes, whom McKenna joined in dissent, thought the limitation was a "condition to the
right" and not a regulation of foreign jurisdiction. Id. at 71. For criticism of the decision
based on modern interest analysis, see B. CURRIE, supra note 117, at 311-26. Of additional
significance is the unexplained assumption of all the Justices in Sowers that the reference to
"public Acts" in the full faith clause and its implementing statute included general statutes.
See supra note 117 (discussing what was meant by "public Acts").
127 See Sowers, 213 U.S. at 67.
128 See, e.g., Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411) (ac-
tion for trespass); 3 J. BEALE, supra note 111, § 613.1 ("only the state where the land lies has
control over the res, and consequently power to affect interests therein").
129 Most of the criticism has been in the context of actions for trespass to land, where
the doctrine has been increasingly discarded. See, e.g., Reasor-Hill Corp. v. Harrison, 220
Ark. 521, 249 S.W.2d 994 (1952); H. GOODRCH & E. SCOLES, supra note 124, § 96; see also A.
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 96, at 83 ("Jurisdiction in rem presupposes a situs of the res within
the boundaries of the forum state."); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 113, § 87 &
comment a (preserving the rule where title to land is at stake). The sovereign power ration-
ale that underlies this presupposition, however, see supra notes 120, 126, 128, is unpersua-
sive in a country blessed with a Constitution requiring respect for sister-state judgments. Cf.
J. STORY, supra note 96, § 551 (conceding that the Roman rule allowing land cases to be
determined by a domiciliary court made sense in a system in which judgments "would be
everywhere respected and obeyed").
130 See J. STORY, supra note 96, § 554.
13 The South Carolina court had attempted to avoid the traditional rule by invoking
the fiction that the owner's death had by "equitable conversion" turned the land into per-
sonal property; the Supreme Court declined to endorse such a ruse. Clarke, 178 U.S. at 191-
92; see M. HANCOCI, supra note 122, at 233 n.26.
12 The policy of repose underlying full faith and credit is as applicable to jurisdictional
questions as it is to the merits, and modem cases have held that even jurisdictional ques-
tions can be foreclosed under the full faith and credit clause once actually litigated. See,
e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963). For an approving view, see B. Currie, supra note
90, at 105. The earlier view was the more formalistic one that a court without jurisdiction
had no more power to determine its own jurisdiction than to determine anything else. See
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however, seem to have been pretty standard in 1900.133 Therefore,
though White's lack of explanation and his stress on Connecticut's
sole power to regulate the transaction seemed to invite a denial of
recognition on choice-of-law grounds in Fauntleroy v. Lum, the
Court in the latter case appears to have recognized Clarke for what
it really was: a straightforward application according to prevailing
jurisdictional principles of the established rule that no credit was
due to the judgment of a court without jurisdiction.1 34
D. Atherton v. Atherton
In Pennoyer v. Neff,1 5 in 1878, the Supreme Court had re-
fused full faith and credit to a judgment for breach of contract on
the ground that failure to serve the defendant with process within
the state had deprived the rendering court of jurisdiction. In Ath-
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 468 (1873) (Bradley, J.). On top of that,
White added in Clarke that the party against whom the South Carolina decree was asserted
had not been sui juris at the time of the South Carolina proceeding (she was a minor) and
that no one before the court had had authority to speak for her in respect to out-of-state
land. 178 U.S. at 193.
133 Even at the time of Clarke, however, there were so many decisions employing avail-
able devices for escaping from the unpalatable consequences of the standard learning that
Professor Hancock was able to describe the local-action rule as "a mere textbook aphorism
that did not accurately represent ... practice." M. HANCOC, supra note 122, at 337.
is' The same is true of the much debated Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909), where in an
obscure and turgid McKenna opinion the Court over the unexplained dissents of Harlan
and Brewer held that Nebraska need not respect a deed to Nebraska land executed by an
officer of the state of Washington pursuant to a Washington decree respecting the division
of the property of Washington spouses incident to a divorce. Despite the similarity of the
case to Clarke, the Court acknowledged that the Washington court had had jurisdiction to
order the husband to convey the land to his wife and that if he had complied the deed
would have been respected. Id. at 5-6, 8, 10-11. This suggests that even traditional rules
were not so protective of the interests of the situs as Clarke might have led one to believe.
The trouble was that the Washington officer had attempted to convey the land itself, and
that only the situs could exercise jurisdiction to affect the land directly. McKenna seemed
to think the distinction as silly as it sounds, but felt bound by it anyway. See id. at 11-12. A
later commentator, while branding the opinion "undiscriminating, confused, unworthy, re-
luctant, and ambiguous," has found justification for the distinction in what he thought was
the greater interference of a foreign commissioner's deed with the functioning of the record-
ing system. See B. Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHL L.
REv. 620, 639-40, 648 (1954). For questions as to this analysis, see R. CRAMTON, D. CuRRmE, &
H. KAY, CONFLIcT OF LAWS: CASE-CMENTrS-QUESTONS 719 (3d ed. 1981).
On this point, see also Brown v. Fletcher's Estate, 210 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1908) (Brewer, J.)
(holding in accord with traditional understanding that a judgment against an administrator
in a suit for an accounting in one state was not binding on an executor of the same decedent
elsewhere, on the ground that each state had exclusive jurisdiction to administer property
within its borders). For a criticism in modern terms, see D. Currie, The Multiple Personal-
ity of the Dead: Executors, Administrators, and the Conflict of Laws, 33 U. CHL L. REv. 429
(1966).
135 95 U.S. 714 (1878), discussed in D. CuRRiu, supra note 3, ch. 11.
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erton v. Atherton, s6 in 1901, the Court held this rule inapplicable
to divorce proceedings, upholding the power of a state where both
husband and wife had lived to exercise jurisdiction over an absent
spouse who had allegedly abandoned her husband. In two compan-
ion cases, however, the Court denied the power of a state in which
neither party was domiciled to affect the rights of an absent
spouse.13 7
These results are easily explicable in modern terms. Atherton
was the typical case for which today's longarm statutes were
designed: it seems entirely consonant with the later due process
tests of "minimum contacts" and "fair play and substantial jus-
tice" to expect an alleged wrongdoer, if actually notified, to litigate
at the scene of the wrong.'-3  The companion cases presented the
other side of the coin: it is unfair to haul a defendant to a forum
with which he or she has had no voluntary contact at all,139 and a
judgment void for want of due process is entitled to no faith
anywhere. 1
40
Justice Gray, however, did not write in these terms. Pennoyer
had been based on tradition, not on fairness; due process at that
time meant historical process.' 4 ' Indeed Gray did not speak of due
136 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
,17 Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U.S. 179 (1901).
138 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (adding that the due process
clause served also "as an instrument of interstate federalism"); cf., e.g., McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) ("It is sufficient for the purpose of due process
that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State.").
119 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958); D. Currie, The Growth of the
Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 548-50.
110 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) ("the
same full faith and credit in every court... as they have ... in the courts... from which
they are taken").
141 The force of tradition had been relaxed before the 1901 cases by Hurtado v. Califor-
nia, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 3, ch. 11, which held that the
historically requisite grand jury was not part of due process because it was not "fundamen-
tal." 110 U.S. at 535. The application of this standard to the particulars of traditional per-
sonal-jurisdiction rules had yet to be worked out in detail. An interesting start had been
made, however, in the famous case of York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890) (Brewer, J.), where
the Court held over the unexplained dissents of Bradley and Gray that due process did not
require a state to permit a special appearance to challenge the assertion of jurisdiction over
the person. Conceding that the special appearance was sanctified by tradition, the Court
said it was enough that the new rule secured "the substance of right. . . without unreasona-
ble burden": the defendant could have protected his right not to be sued in Texas by stay-
ing away and attacking the judgment when the plaintiff sued on it in another state. Id. at
20-21. Brewer did not acknowledge that he could do so only by foregoing the opportunity to
make a defense on the merits in case his jurisdictional attack failed. Cf. Fauntleroy v. Lum,
210 U.S. 230 (1908) (forbidding collateral attack on merits), discussed supra notes 98-103
and accompanying text. Today it might well be found "unreasonable" to require a defen-
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process at all. Though in holding the judgment entitled to respect
he implicitly found it did not offend due process, he was concerned
instead with the more ancient principle that, regardless of domes-
tic validity, full faith was not required if traditional jurisdictional
standards had not been met.142
Just what tradition dictated in the divorce cases was unclear.
Gray quoted at pedantic length from a number of state cases up-
holding jurisdiction over absent spouses in the state where the
other lived,14  added Supreme Court dicta to the same effect,144
and invoked the authority of influential treatises. 45 As in Hunt-
dant to surrender one defense in order to assert another. See Note, Developments in the
Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 991-97 (1960). The common law, how-
ever, was full of such unappetizing choices. For example, the defendant who challenged the
legal basis of the plaintiff's case by demurring thereby lost the right to dispute the facts. See
D. LOUISELL, G. HAZARD, & C. TArT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 84
(5th ed. 1983); cf. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905) (holding a defendant who
appealed a conviction waived double-jeopardy objections to review of his acquittal of an-
other charge in the same case), discussed supra note 15. See also Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S.
398 (1900) (Brown, J.) (holding five days notice to a Virginian to defend in Texas not "rea-
sonable" and thus not due process, but evidently by construing the traditional notice re-
quirement as a requirement of reasonable notice).
141 See D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1851), discussed supra note 85 and
accompanying text. Interesting examples of this principle during the Fuller years include
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm, 174 U.S. 710 (1899) (McKenna, J.), and the well-known
case of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (Peckham, J.), both holding judgments based on
so-called foreign attachment entitled to full faith and credit. In both cases the first suit had
been brought to collect on an obligation owed by a person beyond the reach of service of
process by garnishing a debt owed to the absent person by an individual within the forum
state. Without discussing the implicit due process issue, the Court in Sturm affirmed the
jurisdiction of the court to render a judgment appropriating the garnishee's obligation and
discharging him from further liability to the absent party. It did so on the basis partly of
historical acceptance, partly of the policy in favor of providing a forum, and partly of physi-
cal power over the garnishee. Sturm, 174 U.S. at 714-16. In Sturm the garnishee had been a
resident of the forum state. In Harris he was not; though history revealed a lack of consen-
sus on the question, the Court held residence immaterial because any state where the debtor
was found had power to extract his money. Harris, 198 U.S. at 222.
Under the modern test of fair treatment of the absent party these decisions are quite
untenable, and Harris has been overruled. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); see
also D. Currie, supra note 139, at 584. Even in terms of power the Court's reasoning in
Harris seems misguided: although the forum could physically do as it pleased to the unfor-
tunate garnishee, it had no physical power over his absent creditor, and physical power over
intangible "property" is pure fiction.
,'3 Atherton, 181 U.S. at 164-69.
... Id. at 163-64.
,' Id. at 164, 166 (citing Story (in a quotation from an earlier decision), Kent, and
Cooley). To the extent that the traditional rule requiring service within the state reflected
the supposed futility of entering a judgment that could not be executed-a concern mis-
placed in a federation with a full faith requirement-divorce cases were distinguishable: the
divorce decree would effectively liberate the plaintiff spouse whether or not physical conse-
quences could be visited upon the defendant or his assets.
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ington v. Attrill, 46 however, he had to concede there was contrary
state authority.147 As in Huntington, moreover, he resolved the
conflict in favor of what he thought the more appropriate rule: "To
hold otherwise would make it difficult if not impossible, for the
husband to obtain a divorce for the cause alleged, if it actually ex-
isted." 4" The companion cases were resolved by mere flat: "No
valid divorce . . . can be decreed on constructive service by the
courts of a State in which neither party is domiciled.' 49
Thus the Court seemed to read the full faith and credit clause
to require it to develop what was essentially a federal common law
of state-court jurisdiction, confected from historical practice and
shaped in the mold of public policy. On the facts of Atherton and
its companion cases the Court by this method and with very little
explanation attained results fully in accord with the modern due
process calculus of fair play-if one puts to one side the Court's
strange indifference to whether the defendant had actually been
given notice of the proceeding. 50
E. Andrews v. Andrews
Two years later, over three unexplained dissents, Justice
White wrote for the Court in Andrews v. Andrews"5' to hold that
no credit was due to a divorce decreed by a court of a state in
which neither party lived even if the defendant did not object to
the exercise of jurisdiction. We have discussed the earlier divorce
cases in terms of jurisdiction over the person, which can be waived
14s 146 U.S. 657 (1892), discussed supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
'47 Atherton, 181 U.S. at 169-70.
148 Id. at 173. The dissenters turned this argument around, assuming the facts to be as
found by a court in the state to which the wife had moved: "That a husband can drive his
wife from his home" and then divorce her there was "at war with sound principle and the
adjudged cases." Id. at 175 (Peckham, J., joined by Fuller, C.J., dissenting). In voting to
sustain the judgment of the wife's state, the dissenters showed that they were by no means
hostile to the assertion of jurisdiction over an absent defendant; in their view the jurisdic-
tion of both courts depended on the merits.
149 Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 177 (1901). Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U.S. 179 (1901),
was decided on the authority of Bell. Id. at 182-83.
150 See Atherton, 181 U.S. at 171-72 (saying there was a "presumption" that the wife
had received an unanswered letter of notification, but finding it irrelevant if she had not
because the real question was not actual notice but whether "reasonable steps had been
taken to give her notice"). At least one of the cases relied on had said that service by publi-
cation would suffice on a defendant whose residence was unknown. See id. at 166-67 (citing
Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856)). For the modern view of the notice question, see Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
151 188 U.S. 14 (1903). Brewer, Shiras, and Peckham dissented. Holmes, who had taken
his seat after argument, took no part. Id. at 42.
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because it relates primarily to the convenience of the litigant. 52
But in Andrews the Court explained that Atherton and its com-
panion cases had held domicile essential to jurisdiction over the
subject matter-and a want of subject-matter jurisdiction could
not be cured by consent.'
Like the decision in Clarke v. Clarke that controversies over
land titles were not transitory,154 this characterization was out of
line with the practice governing most lawsuits; analogy to tort or
contract cases would suggest that any court could divorce a New
York couple willing to litigate there so long as New York law was
applied. As Clarke showed, however, there were exceptions. And,
whether or not the exception regarding land made sense, Justice
White revealed in Andrews why there was a special problem in di-
vorce cases. The marriage relation was "so interwoven with public
policy that the consent of the parties is impotent to dissolve it con-
trary to the law of the domicil.' '1 55 If the parties could achieve the
same result by "perpetrating a fraud" on that law "by temporarily
sojourning in another State," then "all efficacious power on the
subject of divorce [would] be at an end.' 56
In short, in the ordinary case any interest the state of the tort
or contract may have in the application of its own law is to some
degree protected by the parties' incentive to insist on application
of provisions that favor them;157 however, in a state with strict di-
vorce laws both parties are likely to be hell-bent to frustrate state
policy. If such laws were not to be evaded at pleasure, some way
had to be found to allow the courts to protect the state's interest
despite the wishes of the parties, and the label of subject-matter
jurisdiction admirably filled the bill. In the first place, it permitted
the court in which a divorce was sought to raise the question of
domicile on its own motion. Moreover, under the view prevailing at
the time of Andrews, subject-matter jurisdiction was always open
to collateral attack. As in Andrews itself, the state of domicile
could protect its own interest, even if the other court did not, by
refusing to recognize the decree.
152 See Note, supra note 141, at 997; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1).
153 188 U.S. at 39-41; cf. Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swain, 111 U.S. 379 (1884) (lack
of diversity jurisdiction not curable by consent of parties); FED. R Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (same).
'" See supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
"5 Andrews, 188 U.S. at 41.
,56 Id. at 38, 32; see also J. STORY, supra note 96, § 226.
157 Even in such a case, as Fauntleroy shows, White argued for protection against the
power of the forum to disregard the applicable law. See supra notes 106-117 and accompa-
nying text.
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With eighty years of hindsight, it may be possible to improve
on White's solution to the problem. The jurisdictional label
achieved the desired result at the risk of denying the parties a pos-
sibly convenient forum; all the Court had to say was that choice-
of-law decisions, like some jurisdictional ones, could not be left to
the parties in divorce cases. 158 That kind of flexibility, however,
was uncommon in turn-of-the-century jurisprudence159 and did not
reflect the traditional rules the Court seemed to think were the
measure of full faith and credit. Furthermore, the cases in which it
was a hardship for the parties to resort to their own courts must
have been relatively rare.160 Andrews came up with an effective so-
lution to the perennial problem of collusive divorce and persua-
sively explained its reasons.
F. Haddock v. Haddock
Yet another variation on the divorce problem was presented
by the landmark case of Haddock v. Haddock'6 ' in 1906. This time
the husband had moved from the marital domicile in New York to
Connecticut, where he had procured an ex parte divorce. New York
refused to recognize the decree, and in another White opinion the
Court affirmed over four dissents. 62
To White the relevant principle was the one he had put forth
in Andrews: if the Connecticut decree were entitled to recognition,
New York could not regulate the marriage relations of her own cit-
izens. 63 To Holmes, dissenting, the case was governed by Ather-
ton: if the domicile of one party could grant a divorce, so could the
domicile of the other.16 4 In modern terms both White and Holmes
18 See D. Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel and
Borax, 34 U. CHL L. RE V. 26, 47-48 (1966).
159 But cf. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (finding the eleventh amend-
ment's facially absolute ban on the exercise of federal judicial power over certain suits
against a state "is a personal privilege which [the state] may waive at pleasure").
160 See Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923) (French divorce of New
Yorkers long resident in France under New York law); D. Currie, supra note 160, at 48 &
n.103 (noting existence of statutes dealing with military personnel). The recognition of the
foreign divorce in Gould shows that the jurisdictional label affixed in Andrews did not nec-
essarily deprive parties of a convenient forum; since the Court did not hold due process
forbade a divorce outside the state of domicile, recognition might still be permitted though
not required.
181 201 U.S. 562 (1906). For a partial list of the copious commentary on this decision,
see H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, supra note 124, at 263 n.53.
162 Justices Brown, Harlan, Brewer, and Holmes dissented. See id. at 606 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
163 Haddock, 201 U.S. at 573-76.
104 Id. at 629-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. Beale, Constitutional Protection of De-
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were wrong.
White was wrong because in Andrews the sole state with any
interest in the matter was the domicile of both parties, while in
Haddock Connecticut had as legitimate a concern with the status
of its domiciliary as New York had in that of its own. Andrews
forbade one state to meddle in another's affairs; Haddock gave ex-
clusive authority to one state over a matter that was the concern of
two.
Holmes was wrong because it was not unfair to require the de-
parting spouse in Atherton to return to her earlier home for litiga-
tion; it would have been unfair to drag the left-behind spouse in
Haddock into a forum in a state with which she had had no con-
nection.16 5 White's legitimate concern for the choice-of-law prob-
lem in Andrews had blinded him to the fact that in Haddock there
was a problem with personal jurisdiction; the traditional insistence
on personal service within the state had deafened Holmes in Had-
dock to the critical distinction in terms of fair play. In the modern
view White reached the right result for the wrong reason, and his
failure to articulate the real concern left his decision vulnerable to
crees for Divorce, 19 HARV. L. REv. 586, 596 (1906) (asserting that the decision "astonished
the whole bar of the country"). White dressed his conclusion in metaphysical terms by say-
ing the marital "res" was located at the marital domicile, which was where the parties had
lived before the husband left the state. Haddock, 201 U.S. at 576-78. Since the res was
fictitious, its invocation could be neither refuted nor supported, and it did not help his case.
See id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
But for Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 3, ch.
11, which had held that marriage was not the kind of transaction protected by the contract
clause, White might better have argued that Connecticut had impaired the obligation of the
marriage contract contrary to article I, section 10, by applying its own law to dissolve a
marriage subject in its inception only to the grounds of divorce specified by New York law.
Cf. M'Millan v. M'Neill, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209 (1819) (contract clause offended by applica-
tion of state insolvency law to contract governed when made by law of another state), dis-
cussed in D. CURRIE, supra note 3, ch. 5. An argument could still have been made that it was
as unfair to determine the rights of the stay-at-home spouse on the basis of the law of a
state with which she had had no connection as to subject her to that state's exercise of
judicial power. See Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of
Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REv. 1031, 1033 (1978); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The
End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 88 (1978) ("To believe that a defendant's contacts with
the forum state should be stronger under the due process clause for jurisdictional purposes
than for choice of law is to believe that the accused is more concerned with where he will be
hanged than whether.").
"' See D. Currie, supra note 139, at 548-50. Compare McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (allowing judgment to be entered against a nonresident insurance
company on a contract that had a substantial connection with the forum state), with Han-
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (refusing to permit a judgment against a nonresident
trust company whose customer became domiciled in the forum state after the transaction
had occurred).
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an attack that should not have succeeded.1 66
In terms of the outcome, White's greatest obstacle was May-
nard v. Hill,67 in which the Court had upheld a divorce granted by
a territorial legislature to a husband who had moved there from
the marital domicile despite the absence of the wife. Without at-
tempting to argue that personal jurisdiction requirements were in-
applicable to legislative divorces, 8 White distinguished Maynard
as having held only that the divorce was valid in the territory
where it had been rendered, not that it was entitled to respect
elsewhere. 169
The dissenters effectively pointed out the difficulty of recon-
ciling the conclusion that a judgment valid where rendered was not
entitled to full faith and credit with the text or purpose of the
clause and its implementing statute. 70 Haddock itself graphically
illustrated the problem: as later Justices were to observe, the result
of that decision was that the Haddocks were married in one state
and not in another-71-clearly an intolerable arrangement in a fed-
eral system.
Modern analysis would have enabled the Court to avoid this
problem by holding that a divorce entered by a court in a state
with which an absent defendant had no contact was entitled to no
respect anywhere because it deprived the defendant of liberty or
property without due process of law.17 2 At the time of Haddock,
166 See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 296-301 (1942) (overruling Haddock);
id. at 316-320 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (complaining that Williams meant that "settled fam-
ily relationships may be destroyed by a procedure that we would not recognize if the suit
were one to collect a grocery bill").
167 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
168 Cf. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890), discussed in D.
Currie, supra note 1, at 371-74. In any event, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), had
already established that due process limited the territorial scope of substantive state legisla-
tion. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text. If Maynard was still law, it thus
seemed to dispose of White's concern that Connecticut was meddling with a marriage whose
continuation was none of its business.
169 Haddock, 201 U.S. at 574-75.
170 Id. at 626 (Brown, J., dissenting); id. at 632-33 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The statute
provided that judicial proceedings "shall have such faith and credit.., in every court...
as they have ... in the courts of the State from which they are ... taken." Act of May 26,
1790, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982)).
171 See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299-300 (1942).
172 See D. Currie, supra note 160, at 28. As an original question one might have
doubted whether marriage rights were either "liberty" or "property" within the due process
clause. See D. Currie, supra note 1, at 375-78 (discussing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897)). But the Court in holding that the clause protected "liberty of contract" had defined
the terms so broadly that the inclusion of marriage should no more have raised eyebrows
when Haddock was decided than it did when due process was first applied to a divorce case
many years later. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953).
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however, the distinction between validity at home and respect
abroad for decisions not satisfying traditional jurisdictional stan-
dards was firmly established;173 to have reached the due process
question would not only have required confronting Maynard but
would also have gone beyond what was necessary to decide the
case.
CONCLUSION
"Oh, but there were Giants on the Court in those days." So
Fuller is reported to have said of his early years on the Bench,174
and so there were. Within a short time, however, the three tallest
gave way to ordinary mortals: Miller, Bradley, and Field were re-
placed by Brown, Shiras, and McKenna. These sad substitutions
set the tone for what was to come; in terms of personnel, the Fuller
period was a drab time in the history of the Court.
Matthews, Blatchford, and Lamar also disappeared early, but
they were hardly missed. Jackson, Moody, and Lurton served too
briefly to make much of an impression. 175 Of the eleven Justices
who did the bulk of the constitutional work during this period,
only four have a serious claim to eminence in that field.
The first is Gray, whose erudition was said to have approached
Story's,17 and who had made a substantial contribution to the
work of the Court during the eight years preceding Fuller's ap-
pointment. Though he continued to sit for more than half the
Fuller era, however, his performance was rather disappointing. He
wrote none of the important economic decisions, nor did he dissent
from them. His major constitutional work was in the abstruse
fields of full faith and credit and the negative effect of the com-
merce clause, where he argued for greater state authority and
helped rationalize the confused law. His opinions tended to be
larded with history, but his use of history was more affected than
'73 Professor Beale, supra note 166, at 594, indignantly denied there was any such dis-
tinction; but the initial state judgment in D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1851)
(upholding state's refusal to give full faith to New York judgment rendered without service
of process on defendant), discussed supra note 91, for example, had been entered in accor-
dance with a statute that the Court did not even suggest was unconstitutional. See Scho-
field, The Doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock, 1 ILL. L. REv. 219, 225-29 (1906).
1' See W. KING, supra note 10, at 125.
17' Moody was a much-admired lawyer, forced by ill health to retire after only four
years but nonetheless described as "one of the ablest Justices of his period." See id. at 308-
09, 316-17.
M78 See, e.g., id. at 132-33.
1985]
The University of Chicago Law Review
effective. 1 7 There was no need to explore all Western civilization
to prove that the fourteenth amendment meant what it said about
the children of aliens born in the United States,78 for example,
and history gave conflicting answers to the scope of the penal ex-
ception to recognition of judgments, which he resolved in Hunting-
ton v. Attrill by mere assertion. 1 9 Despite his promise, in constitu-
tional cases Gray was neither an important voice on the Fuller
Court nor distinguished by the quality of his opinions.
The other significant holdover from the Waite days was
Harlan, who continued to sit with great vigor throughout the time
Fuller was Chief Justice. He wrote over a hundred constitutional
opinions during this period, substantially more than any other Jus-
tice. He also differed with his brethren far more than anyone else,
and he found time to write about fifty dissenting opinions in con-
stitutional cases-three times as many as any of his colleagues.
As foretold by his earlier record, Harlan's work was most no-
ticeably marked by his strong support for civil rights and for the
police power. In a series of impassioned dissents, he argued for ra-
cial equality, for the incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the four-
teenth amendment, and for the application of constitutional provi-
sions to the territories. He wrote for the Court to uphold several
important economic measures and dissented from the invalidation
of several others. While alert to protect interstate activities from
practical as well as facial discrimination, he was perhaps the lead-
ing exponent of the emerging principle that reasonable police-
power measures should be upheld despite their effects on com-
merce. Yet for all this he was no opponent of substantive due pro-
cess as such; it may come as a surprise that he was the author of
the famous opinions invalidating unreasonable rail rates and the
ban on contracts not to join unions.
Even a brief recitation of Harlan's accomplishments reveals
him as a figure of considerable importance in the Court's history,
and the country has since come around to many of the views he
177 "[I]t is this very adherence to the common law and exhaustive historical research
which, in the writer's view, deprived Gray of his rightful place in the history of the Supreme
Court .... ." Smith, Mr. Justice Horace Gray of the United States Supreme Court, 6
S.D.L. REv. 220, 246 (1961).
178 See D. CURRiE, supra note 1, at 338 n.87 (discussing United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)).
79 See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text. "Holmes used to say of Gray that
the premise of his opinion and the conclusion stood forth like precipices, with a roaring
torrent of precedents between, but he never quite understood how Gray got across ....
FRANCIS BIDDLE, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 103 (1942).
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expressed in often solitary dissents. I s0 In several important opin-
ions, moreover-such as the dissents in Lochner,18 1 E.C. Knight,82
and Plessy v. Ferguson'ss -he put forth persuasive arguments in
support of his position. He lacked the incisiveness of Miller or Ta-
ney, the learning of Bradley or Story, the magisterial style of Cur-
tis or Marshall, the imagination and theoretical strength of
Field.18 4 Nevertheless, by any criterion he was one of the standouts
of the Fuller period.
The third Justice of note was White, who in sixteen years with
Fuller richly earned his unprecedented promotion to succeed the
latter as Chief Justice. Though he did not write for the Court in
the great economic controversies of the day, he captured attention
by the power and originality of his theories in three fields outside
the mainstream. It was White who first explained the limits of the
nondelegation doctrine in realistic modern terms, who fought tena-
ciously for an interpretation of the full faith and credit clause that
would allow states to regulate their own affairs, and who advocated
the powerful incorporation thesis ultimately adopted to govern the
status of territories. White's most conspicuous failing was in
Mankichi, where he neglected to explain why the argument he had
expressly employed only as an interpretation of a clause limited to
"the United States" applied to jury-trial provisions containing no
such limitation.18 5 But he was a major intellectual force on the
Court at a time when they were in short supply.
We come at last to Holmes. From the day he arrived, the man
with the marvelous mustache displayed dazzling skills that left his
more pedestrian colleagues in the shade. In terms of sheer produc-
tivity he was prodigious. In eight years he cranked out nearly as
many constitutional opinions as the Chief Justice wrote in over
twenty, far surpassing even Harlan in constitutional opinions per
year. He turned them out with remarkable alacrity; cases in which
Holmes wrote were not infrequently decided within two weeks af-
ISO See FRANK LATHAM, THE GREAT DISSENTER passim (1970); Watt & Orlikoff, The
Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan, 44 ILL. L. REv. 13 (1949); White, John Marshall
Harlan I The Precursor, 19 AM. J. LEG. HisT. 1 (1975). For a laudatory assessment at the
time of his death, see Brown, The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan, 46 AM. L.
REv. 321 (1912).
181 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
,81 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 18 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), discussed in D. CURRIE, supra note
3, ch. 11.
'1 Holmes once wrote that Harlan's mind was "a powerful vise the jaws of which
couldn't be got nearer than two inches to each other." W. KING, supra note 10, at 131.
188 See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
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ter argument.18 6 And his style! His opinions are a breath of fresh
air. Gray, Harlan, and White could make good ideas uninteresting;
Holmes made the dullest case a literary adventure.
Yet, for all their stylistic appeal, the constitutional opinions of
Holmes's first years are substantively not very satisfying. He was
adept enough in putting forth interesting ideas, such as the cur-
rent-of-commerce theory justifying federal regulation of stockyard
sales, but he tended to advance them essentially as unsupported
conclusions. His treatment of the serious freedom of expression is-
sues in Patterson v. Colorado18 7 was indifferent in the extreme. 8s
His most celebrated opinion of the time illustrates his inclination
to substitute epigrams for analysis: instead of taking Lochner as
the opportunity to show what the due process clause was all about,
Holmes contented himself with the smug assertion that the clause
did not "enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Stati'cs.'18e
Like Harlan, Holmes was important because history has em-
braced his frequent dissenting views. Like no one before him, he
was a master of the well-turned phrase. Like Miller, however, he
did not always take the trouble to justify his clever conclusions; 9°
and he wrote few of the major decisions of the Court while Fuller
was Chief Justice.
Fuller, who at the beginning kept for himself such monumen-
tal opinions as those on the sugar trust and the income tax, later
left the big cases to others to a degree quite foreign to the practice
of his four immediate predecessors.' 9 ' He stayed away from the
great due process cases, though he joined them; in the politically
significant insular cases he found himself in dissent. Indeed,
though Fuller wrote dissenting opinions only in major cases-he
was recorded as dissenting at least fifty times in constitutional
se See W. KING, supra note 10, at 290-91 (noting that Holmes often asked for more
work and quoting Holmes's observation that "[a] case doesn't generally take more than two
days if it does that.").
205 U.S. 454 (1907), discussed in D. Currie, supra note 1, at 374 n.301.
Cf. Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion (pt. 2), 15 STAN. L. REv. 254,
308 (1963) (arguing on the basis of decisions respecting aliens and race that "the accepted
image of Holmes as uniquely libertarian owes more to the fantasies unloosed by the attrac-
tiveness of his personality than to the realities of his career").
189 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
190 See Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion (pt. 1), 15 STAN. L. REv. 3, 9
(1962); White, The Integrity of Holmes' Jurisprudence, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 633, 664, 671
(1982) (describing Holmes as "a judge whose principal interest seems to have been in having
cases decided, written up, and disposed of" and tracing this attitude to a conviction that
judging was largely a matter of arbitrary preferences that could not be satisfactorily
explained).
1"1 See W. KING, supra note 10, at 332-33.
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matters-he was in far less control of the outcome than either Ta-
ney or Waite had been, not to mention Marshall. Moreover, the
quality of his opinions was not high. Leisy' 92 was a string of un-
focused quotations, E.C. Knight193 distorted the controversy, Pol-
lock 194 was internally contradictory and neglected available argu-
ments. The contrast between Fuller's conclusions that the sugar
trust did not restrain commerce and that the Danbury hat boycott
did suggests that he may not have been guided exclusively by neu-
tral legal principles. 195
Brewer and Peckham were in the forefront of the Court's as-
sault on social legislation. Brewer continued to argue that rate reg-
ulation was unconstitutional, took the lead in the few decisions
striking down measures on equal protection grounds, and dissented
from several decisions rejecting due process objections to state reg-
ulatory provisions such as the limitation of miners' hours. 9 '
Peckham was the Court's chief spokesman for the new liberty of
contract and dissented even more frequently from decisions up-
holding state or federal regulation. Peckham was not an effective
advocate: Allgeyer 97 and Lochner 98 were bare conclusions, Ex
parte Young 9 ' butchered the law of sovereign immunity, and he
almost never bothered to explain his dissenting votes. Brewer was
not so noticeably weak, and his commitment to economic rights
was coupled with a conspicuous respect for civil rights as well,
most prominently in cases respecting aliens. But in Debs200 he
seemed oblivious to the distinction between congressional and ju-
dicial power, and his opinions in general do not make much of an
impression.
Four Justices remain: Brown, Shiras, McKenna, and Day.
Brown was a relatively important member of the Court, best
known today for his callous opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson,20' con-
'gz Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
"' United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, modified on reh'g, 158 U.S. 601
(1895).
295 Fuller's skills as presiding Justice, however, were widely admired. Miller and
Holmes, for example, both of whom served with a number of Chief Justices, were said to
have regarded Fuller as the best presiding judge they had encountered. See W. KING, supra
note 10, at 127, 290, 333-34.
198 For a rather sympathetic modern assessment, see Garner, Justice Brewer and Sub-
stantive Due Process: A Conservative Court Revisited, 18 VAND. L. REV. 615 (1965).
197 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
199 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
", 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
20 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
201 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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structive in the development of commerce-clause jurisprudence,
and notable for his extreme position that the Constitution applied
to none of the territories.20 2 Shiras attracted little attention in
nearly a dozen years, writing nothing of interest for the Court but
providing a few intelligent dissents. Day sat nearly as long as
Holmes and left virtually no trace. McKenna, very likely the most
inept writer of them all,20 3 managed an uncharacteristically effec-
tive dissent on the commerce clause issue in the yellow-dog case.
In sum, the Fuller period was a time of important decisions;
but it was not on the whole a strong period in the Court's history.
202 See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text. For a description and criticism of
Brown's work as a whole, see Glennon, Justice Henry Billings Brown: Values in Tension, 44
U. COLo. L. REv. 553 (1973).
203 McKenna's appointment prompted two federal trial judges to take the unusual step
of writing letters lamenting his unfitness for the post, as evidenced by his performance as a
circuit judge. See W. KING, supra note 10, at 228-30 (adding that McKenna's colleagues
"always felt in him some judicial inadequacy" and that "Fuller took care to assign to him
the simpler cases").
